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24 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 24 June 1969

Acting Director was in the chair, the Director having departed for Europe this morning.



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DD/I noted that the NSC will meet at 10 a.m. tomorrow morning to consider the SALT paper and observed that General Cushman may be asked to brief on "verification."

Godfrey pointed to an attack on Muong Soui involving probably three North Vietnamese battalions. He observed that the attack is unusual in that it is taking place in the rainy season and may indicate a serious attempt to take the area.

D/ONE related that Howard Brown, the AEC USIB representative, had called to say that he would like to discuss certain aspects of NIE 11-2, Soviet Nuclear Programs, with other quarters in the AEC prior to the USIB meeting. Consequently, D/ONE observed that this major item may not be on the USIB agenda for next Thursday.

D/ONE noted that he has assembled copies of the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8 for delivery to PFIAB members. Bross commented that General Maxwell Taylor had expressed an interest in obtaining this Memorandum and said that, in his view, it was a reasonable request in light of the President's having tasked the Board to assess the threat. After some discussion General Cushman noted that he will handcarry the Memorandum to the Board meeting and give the members a brief speech on the security and accountability requirements connected with their handling of the Memorandum.

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5X1 [] mentioned that he spent forty-five minutes with PFIAB yesterday on the Pueblo matter and noted that the Board was most interested in what remedial action can be taken to prevent a similar situation from occurring in the future.

5X1 []

Carver called attention to Murrey Marder's story in today's Washington Post and noted some surprise at Le Duc Tho's critical comments about the President.

Carver summarized his briefing before PFIAB yesterday.

*Maury noted that he did not accompany the Director yesterday for his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but that he gained some insight by being present in Carl Marcy's office at the time of the briefing. He mentioned that some follow-up action is required and that the DD/S&T and Bruce Clarke are at work on these items. He summarized the President's directive to the Director on future ground rules with respect to our relationships with the Hill. Executive Director asked Maury to commit these ground rules to writing and to circulate them to the appropriate offices. A transcript of the hearing is now in hand, and Maury noted that all references to the Director's testimony will be deleted. The Director has advised that we make appropriate efforts to sanitize those portions of Secretary Laird's testimony which may be unusually sensitive. DD/I stated that he will contact Mr. Baroody to determine what deadline has been assigned for the release of Secretary Laird's testimony. Maury mentioned that he was able to observe the flow of information from the hearing room to Mr. Finney.

5X1 Maury noted receipt of a call from Congressman Hastings Keith requesting a briefing on the SS-9. Upon being turned down, he asked for a briefing on the Soviet leadership. DD/I commented that Bill [] is in the best position to identify useful material.

Executive Director noted that, while our quota may be filled, there are vacancies in the Federal Executive Institute's seminar which commences on 16 July. He asked each Executive Committee

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member to forward to the Director of Training the names of any candidates for this eight-week course. DD/S noted that the Director of Training is reviewing names previously submitted.

Executive Director reported that the DOD takeover of the RDC program now appears to look a little better and advised that Bob Michaels and Bill Woodruff are reviewing the situation with us and DOD in order that some appropriate language can be introduced into the record to make it clear that it is the sentiment of Congress to effect the transfer as scheduled.

*Executive Director asked each Executive Committee member to consider now procedures which can be set into motion to facilitate briefing the Director upon his return (on or about 9 July). After some discussion it was decided that cabled items destined for the Director's information in Europe should be in General Cushman's office for review by 4 p.m. each working day. Executive Director observed that hopefully such items will be few and restricted to matters of major importance. With respect to papers, memoranda, etc., which should be reviewed by the Director upon his return, it was observed that events often overtake what seems to warrant the Director's attention. Therefore each Executive Committee member was asked to save such items which appear to deserve the Director's attention and to forward them to General Cushman or the Executive Director's office as appropriate shortly before the Director's return.

Acting Director called attention to the deteriorating situation in the Sudan. Godfrey commented that the political dynamics are confused and that the principals are a mixture of pro-Egyptians and known Communists. Godfrey added that they will begin to publish as soon as they can get this sorted out, [redacted]

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X1 [redacted] noted receipt of a call from NBC television indicating that they are doing a program on Negro Federal employees. The caller asked whether our racial mix has been influenced by our move to Virginia. Executive Director commented that we have detected no change in the mix of our employees or attendant recruitment patterns. (Following the meeting the Executive Director provided [redacted] with additional guidance on the matter.)

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[redacted]
L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

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Retrieval Date 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80R01284A0018001

*Ho's Strategist
Spurns Voting
Compromise*

By Murrey Marder
Washington Post Staff Writer

PARIS, June 24—North Vietnam's chief strategist in Paris rejects in advance any compromise with the Saigon regime for using a mixed commission of Communists and non-Communists to organize a special election to decide South Vietnam's political fate.

Opposition to any form of compromise involving the

present government in Saigon —on which the Nixon Administration has pinned its hopes for a diplomatic settlement of the war—was expressed yesterday by Hanoi Politburo member Le Duc Tho.

In an interview with The Washington Post, Tho equally ruled out any form of international supervision or participation in an election test in South Vietnam. He similarly brushed aside any prospect for formal or tacit agreement to reduce the level of fighting so long as the Nixon Administration tries "to proceed from a position of strength" to end the war.

The harshest language was aimed at President Nixon personally.

Mr. Nixon's "personality" and his deeds since he has been in office, said Tho, have revealed a "warlike nature" that has produced a policy reflecting "the most warlike military circles in the United States."

Tho said that in the five months since President Nixon has been in office he has engaged in "futile . . . maneuvers" that "can be compared to building castles in the air."

Now time is running out on the President, said Tho.

"Mr. Nixon finds himself in a vicious circle. He wants to withdraw U.S. forces from South Vietnam but he fears that the puppet army and the puppet administration will collapse. But if Mr. Nixon is determined to pursue the war, U.S. casualties will increase ...

"The intention of Mr. Nixon is to stay in Vietnam in order to build up the puppet army and administration that will permit the prolongation of the war. But I think that time is not on the side of Mr. Nixon.

"Now . . . what has Mr. Nixon been able to achieve in his last five months at the conference table? We may say that he has achieved nothing."

The essence of Tho's attack has been reverberating for some weeks here across the conference table.

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Top Hanoi Aide Spurns Nixon Moves

TALKS, From A1

But what Tho added was a highly personal attack from the leading Communist policymaker on this scene, who is one of the highest-ranking colleagues of North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh and a veteran revolutionary whose words carry special weight in Hanoi.

Tho's apparent objective was to maximize the pressures of American dissent and war frustration mounting on the Nixon Administration, to put pressure on Washington to accept the Vietcong-North Vietnam ten-point plan for ending the war—most especially, to abandon the present South Vietnamese regime.

The thrust of Tho's remarks was intended to show no ray of hope; no way around yielding to the demands of the Communist side.

His comments appeared to support the prevailing allied strategy assessment that the Communist side is determined, at least in the next few weeks of these talks, to show a totally uncompromising posture in order to stimulate more American and international demands on the Nixon Administration for a change of policy. The question among allied strategists is whether, after a time, the Communist side will shift to a more flexible negotiating stand if U.S. policy remains unchanged.

Others Expound Theme

Normally, Tho rarely speaks in public here, but now officials on the Communist side of the negotiations have joined in expounding a similar theme. Tho's official title is "special adviser" to North Vietnamese delegation chief Xuan Thuy. But the white-haired Tho, a man of dignity and evident power, is recognized as the dominant strategist, facing U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, as he did Lodge's predecessor, W. Averell Harriman, who was much impressed with him as an adversary.

Tho indirectly confirmed, in a recent remark when he referred to a discussion with Lodge, that he has talked with Lodge privately, at least once. In the interview, however, when asked if he saw any prospect for surmounting the negotiating barriers here by further private talks with Lodge, Tho said:

"We think that private meetings do not constitute a decisive factor in settling the problem. If the U.S. is not serious and has no good will, whatever private meetings there have been and how many private meetings there may be, they cannot settle the problem."

Tho also said: "In the previous month, Mr. Nixon spread rumors to the effect that there were many secret meetings between us and the United States Administration and that a settlement was about to be reached. But the truth is not so."

On the 19th of June, Tho said, "Mr. Nixon also hinted settlement between two months. His intention created hope among the American people. But the fact no progress at all has been made in the meetings. In fact, the talks are very far

from a discussion of substance and we hope within the next two to three months to see some progress in substantive discussions."

Tho, speaking in Vietnamese at his delegation headquarters here in suburban Choisy-le-Roi, with a North Vietnamese interpreter translating his words into English, developed the theme that all responsibility for the impasse in these talks rests squarely on President Nixon.

"The personality of Mr. Nixon," said Tho, speaking partially from written notes, is especially important because "the President of the United States is in a position to make decisions on war without having the consent of the Senate and the House of Representatives."

That reference was one of many scattered through Tho's comments that appeared to be acutely and adroitly aimed at appealing to the sensitivities of Mr. Nixon's war critics.

The most important new element in Tho's comments was his seeming off-handed rejection of the most sensitive objective in the Nixon Administration's attempts to nudge the Saigon government into negotiating range of the Vietcong.

This is the potential offer by the Saigon regime of a new form of "political settlement" which was referred to on June 19 by President Nixon—reportedly to Saigon's high irritation because Mr. Nixon publicly anticipated its action. This offer centers on the so-called mixed-commission approach to an election as an alternative to the Communist demand for outright replacement of the Saigon regime by a provisional coalition government, which would then conduct its own election for an entirely new government system.

Denied by Saigon

The Saigon government today denied reports that such a plan, to allow Communist membership on an election board, is even in the offing.

There have been growing doubts that the Communists will participate in an election that the Saigon government helps to organize. Those doubts have increased considerably since the Vietcong announced earlier this month that they have formed a provisional revolutionary government as an outright "legal" challenger to the Saigon regime.

Tho virtually brushed the whole question aside. There is no room whatever for such an approach, he said, in view of the ten-point political program of the National Liberation Front, or Vietcong. That program is now the program of the new NLF government, as well as the program of North Vietnam.

"As I have pointed out," he said, "in the ten-point overall solution, general elections are to be organized by a provisional coalition government. And only in this way can fair and democratic elections be held. No other body than this provisional coalition government can organize fair and democratic elections."

Tho was similarly inflexible on the question of international supervision of any election.

In his indictment of Nixon Administration policy, Tho singled out, as formal Communist statements here have done, President Nixon's speech at the Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, on June 4. In the speech, Mr. Nixon firmly defended the necessity of American military strength to preserve global stability and assailed critics of U.S. military power.

"This statement of Mr. Nixon," Tho charged, "has revealed the warlike nature of Mr. Nixon" and shows "that Mr. Nixon is still pursuing a policy of positions-of-strength on all problems of the world."

... these words by Mr. Nixon have been embodied in his policy in Vietnam, on the battlefield as well as at the conference table."

Tho said that "the U.S. has been continuing to exert maximum military pressure on the battlefield. The amount of bombs and ammunition it used during the last five months can be said to have exceeded the bombs and ammunition used in every other period since the beginning of the war."

Claims NLF Strong

He said that "from the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam" on Nov. 1 "to January, 1969, the U.S. was of the opinion that the NLF forces on the battlefield have been weakened and that the NLF forces have not been in a position to carry on their activity, and that is why the U.S. has intensified its own activity."

"But the reality," he continued, "is that NLF forces have not weakened in any way. In February, the Front intensified the war just to give an answer to the intensified attacks of the U.S...."

Tho claimed that there have been more "counter-attacks" than the allied forces have admitted.

He said, "In the month of February when we counter-attacked the enemy powerfully, Mr. Nixon made noisy statements about this, threatening the resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam. But after his threats were revealed [to be] in vain, now that our people are increasing their counterattacks against the enemy, Mr. Nixon is keeping quiet... and a number of papers under the influence of Mr. Nixon have not spoken about these counterattacks. Mr. Nixon's intention is to conceal the truth."

Tho was asked for comment on recent statements by Harriman that the Communist side was prepared for a "disengagement" last November. Harriman said he and his then deputy in Paris, Cyrus Vance, believed that when the North Vietnamese pulled out of their troops out of the northern provinces of South Vietnam this represented a political action on their part."

But because North Vietnam

it has any troops in the South, Tho did not respond directly to the issue. He said:

"As to the comment made by Mr. Harriman, I think every person has a right to give his own comment and I have no remarks on Mr. Harriman's comment."

Tho, tracing his version of the history of the Vietnamese war, said the U.S. is now engaged in duplicating its "failures" of the last 15 years.

The U.S. was defeated in the "special war" it conducted before introducing its own massive forces into South Vietnam, said Tho.

Now, he added, "after four years of local war, which failed, the United States wants to withdraw gradually and build up the puppet army and administration to shoulder the main responsibility of the war while the U.S. stands aside, commanding and aiding the puppet army and administration to carry on the war. In other words, the United States wants to revert to the special war as before."

Sees Effort Doomed

But this is also doomed, said Tho. "The U.S. has started to try this," he added. "This can be seen at the Dakto battlefield, Xuanloc and Bienhoa. As can be seen from these cases, the U.S. has let the puppet forces [be] directly defeated and the U.S. had to come as reinforcement and saving forces..."

"We can say that this was the first step of de-Americanization or 'Vietnamization' of the war, and that this first step of the maneuver has failed..."

Tho was asked to comment on the recent proposal by former Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford for a withdrawal this year of "about 100,000" U.S. troops as part of a general pullout of all American combat forces by the end of 1970.

He replied that "if Mr. Clifford desires to withdraw U.S. troops more rapidly than Mr. Nixon from South Vietnam then I realize that there is to some extent a positive aspect in his statement. But there is a very important point; that is that Mr. Clifford still wants to maintain in South Vietnam the U.S. Air Force and logistic troops to help the puppet troops to de-Americanize the war. This is the wrong point in his position."

An equally "wrong point" in Clifford's position, said Tho, is that "only after the withdrawal of what he called the North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam will the U.S. withdraw all its forces... As for us, we demand the U.S. troops and the troops of its allies be rapidly withdrawn from South Vietnam without any conditions being imposed."

Tho nevertheless made it evident, as he did at a reception here Thursday night, that despite what he claims to be a total lack of movement in these talks on the part of the United States and South Vietnam, his delegation does desire to break them off.

Even when asked if the allied and Communist sides here are "further apart" than ever on political questions" as a result of President Nixon's latest show of support for the Saigon government, Tho avoided any charge of an absolutely impenetrable

LAIRD NARROWS SCOPE OF WARNING ON SOVIET THREAT

Tells Senators First-Strike
Missile Is Designed Only
to Counter Minuteman

C.I.A. HEAD AT HEARING

Secretary's Stand Seen by
Fulbright and Gore as Aid
in Blocking Safeguards

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 23 —

Under critical cross-examination by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird retreated today from his statement that the Soviet Union was seeking a missile first-strike capability, against the United States.

Testifying three months ago before the committee, Mr. Laird stated that the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability — there is no question about that."

Recalled before the committee at a closed hearing today, he offered a new definition of Soviet intentions that was much narrower than his earlier suggestion that the Soviet Union was seeking to knock out the retaliatory capability of the United States.

In a prolonged argument with committee members that often involved semantics, Secretary Laird finally took the position that all he was suggesting was that the Soviet Union was developing a "first strike weapon" with its SS-9 intercontinental missile. This weapon, in turn, he acknowledged, was aimed at only one portion of the United States retaliatory force, the Minuteman Missile.

See Semantic Victory

Senator J. W. Fulbright, the committee chairman, and Senator Albert Gore, chairman of the disarmament subcommittee, immediately seized upon the Laird modification as at least a semantic victory in their battle to block deployment of the Administration's Safeguard missile defense system.

From the start of the anti-ballistic missile debate, Senator Gore observed, a key issue has been whether the Safeguard system was necessary to preserve the integrity of the American nuclear deterrent.

If the Soviet Union was intent on knocking out the American deterrent, as suggested in the earlier Laird "first strike" statement, the Tennessee Democrat said, then justification could be made

Continued on Page 16, Column 3

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 1969

Laird Narrows Scope of Warning on Missiles

Continued From Page 1, Col. 1

for the Safeguard system. But if the Soviet Union is developing only a capability to strike at just one part of the deterrent force, he said, "then the whole justification is pulled out — like Samson pulled out the pillars of the temple."

'Most Difficult Session'

Mr. Laird testified for nearly five hours before the committee in what Senator Fulbright, an Arkansas Democrat, was to describe as "the most difficult session" in his 25 years in Congress. The purpose of the closed door confrontation was to resolve whether there were differences between the intelligence community and the Pentagon over the Soviet missile threat.

In an unusual move, Secretary Laird insisted that he be accompanied by Richard Helms, the Director of Central Intelligence, a condition reluctantly accepted by the committee.

It was the first time in the memory of Central Intelligence Agency officials that the director had been drawn directly into a policy dispute between a Cabinet official and a Congressional committee. The effort was to silence Mr. Helms, who is known to have reservations about the Laird assessments of the Soviet missile threat.

Had Little to Say

Mr. Helms, according to members, had little to say before the committee and not a word afterward to reporters as he emerged from the committee room with Mr. Laird.

But Secretary Laird was not so reticent. After a brief appearance before television cameras outside the committee room, he hastened back to the Pentagon to hold an impromptu news conference at which he emphasized a new Soviet missile threat.

Following up a point first made by President Nixon at his news conference last week, Mr. Laird said the Soviet Union was testing a multiple warhead for its SS-9 missile that was capable of knocking out three Minuteman missiles simultaneously.

He thus opened a new intelligence dispute with the safeguard opponents. During the hearing, according to both Senators Fulbright and Gore, no evidence was presented indicating that the Soviet Union was testing independently targetable multiple warheads known as MIRV's, for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.



Associated Press

Richard Helms, left, Director of the C.I.A., and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird at the Capitol for the Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Soviet missile strength.

assert before the television cameras that the United States intelligence Board—the top level, interagency body that coordinates intelligence estimates—had made no finding supporting Mr. Laird's statement that the Soviet Union was seeking a first-strike capability.

Disagreement Denied

An hour later before the cameras, Mr. Laird asserted that there was "no disagreement" within the intelligence community on intelligence "facts" about the Soviet Union and that "there is no question about interpretation" of these facts.

While the Intelligence Board may have not made any findings supporting the Laird conclusions, committee members, when pressed by reporters, acknowledged that the board had not made any findings contradicting the Laird first-strike assessment.

The point was emphasized at the Pentagon by Mr. Laird, who said the board had "never even considered" whether the SS-9 missile was a first-strike weapon or whether the Soviet Union was striving for a first-strike capability.

"They don't get into evaluations such as that," he explained.

Probably the biggest haggle that developed between the committee and Mr. Laird—one that consumed nearly two hours—was over the definition of "first strike," particularly as

it was used by the Secretary when he told the committee on March 21 that the Soviet Union was "going for a first-strike capability."

Finds It Narrower

Senators Gore and Fulbright observed that the term "first strike" used to mean the ability to knock out or destroy the retaliatory capability of an opponent. But now, Senator Fulbright said, Mr. Laird is offering an interpretation of first strike that is "much narrower and more restricted than it was originally."

Mr. Laird's new definition, the Senator said, was somewhat confusing because the Secretary offered "variations from minute to minute that were incredible." But as now used by Mr. Laird, he said, the term "first strike" seems to have the relatively restricted meaning that the SS-9 is a weapon that has a capacity to destroy a missile in its silo.

This interpretation seemed to be supported by Mr. Laird after the meeting. Asked by reporters for his definition of first strike, he said it was the difference between a first-strike weapon that can be used against "hardened" targets, such as missile silos, and second-strike weapons that can be used against "soft" targets, such as cities. He then noted that "first-strike weapons can also be used as second strike weapons."

Less Sophisticated

The presumption, therefore, was that the intelligence community believed the Soviet Union was testing less sophisticated multiple re-entry vehicles, known as MRV's, which fall in a cluster and are not independently targeted.

At his Pentagon news conference, Mr. Laird declined to be drawn into a dispute over the multiple warheads being tested by the Soviet Union were independently guided. The important point, he said, is that the three-part multiple warhead is falling into a variable triangular pattern that coincides with the way Minuteman missiles are deployed.

Another semantic difference developed between Mr. Laird and the committee over whether the Pentagon and the intelligence community disagreed over the Soviet missile threat.

23 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 23 June 1969



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
Godfrey noted an excellent CS report of a Soviet diplomatic statement to all Soviet embassies making it clear that China rather than the United States is the Soviet Union's principal adversary. The Director called attention to Joe Alsop's column in today's Washington Post, "Massive Russian Buildup Along Border Indicated."

Carver noted the cable exchange over the weekend reacting to the Reuters story of 21 June alleging some high-level meeting in Saigon by President Thieu and his senior advisors. Carver added that the Embassy and Station have no confirming information that such a meeting took place (Embassy-Saigon 12567 to State).

Maury noted the untimely death of Congressman William Bates and pointed to the obituary in today's Washington Post reporting on his favorable attitude toward the Agency.

Maury reported that Congressman Lipscomb feels he is not informed on Agency problems and is seldom briefed by Bob Michaels. Maury said that he will plan to see Congressman Lipscomb once or twice a week. The Director thought this a good idea.

Maury mentioned that he saw Ken BeLieu on Friday and had an opportunity to discuss with him once again our plans to approach Senators Thurmond, Hruska, and Byrd on the Ervin bill.

DD/S&T reported that plans are under way in connection with the annual inspection 

Executive Director briefed on his attendance at the Executive Officers Group conference in Charlottesville, Virginia. He noted that the conference was good and attracted a number of senior officials as speakers. He highlighted the difficulties that lie ahead with respect to the FY 70 and 71 budgets in terms of anticipated reductions in funds and positions throughout the Government. He noted that there was some mention of a projected 50 percent reduction of United States personnel overseas. Executive Director added that Frank Sherwood, Executive Director of the Federal Executive Institute, spoke to the group most favorably on the competence of Agency officers attending the Institute. Sherwood indirectly praised our in-house training program by making the observation that top-notch Institute participants come from agencies which have high-quality training programs.

The Director observed that the new draft Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-8 is now in good shape.

The Director thanked those who participated with him on Saturday in reviewing his material for today's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Director noted that he will be departing tomorrow for a two-week visit in Europe and that General Cushman will be in charge.

L. K. White



Joseph Alsop

Massive Russian Buildup Along Border Indicated

LESS THAN two weeks ago, a Soviet-Chinese Communist war was half expected to break out immediately by certain members of the U.S. Government's inner group. The reason was the extraordinary manner of transmission of Moscow's stiff note to Peking, demanding talks about the disputed Sino-Soviet border at an early date.

Undoubtedly on instructions from Moscow, the Soviet Embassy here insisted upon presenting this document, of no outward interest to the U.S., with the greatest urgency and at a very high level. It was all highly reminiscent of the manner of presentation of the Soviet document that announced and excused the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

In other quarters, it has already been accurately reported that a great sea-change has come over the analysts' and experts' ideas concerning armed conflict between Communist China and the Soviet Union. It was once excluded as really impossible. It is now variously rated, from a 10 per cent possibility up to a 40 per cent possibility—which is pretty high!

In itself, this is a startling development. Some of the facts that have caused the development are equally startling. Begin on June 1 for instance, the trans-Siberian railroad was closed to private travellers; and there is every reason to believe that some sections of this super-vital supply line are still not open for civilian traffic.

THAT SEEMS to mean—that almost *must* mean—hurried military movements along the trans-Siberian on a really massive scale. No measures of this scale of duration were thought to be necessary during the earlier period of Soviet troop build-up on the long Chinese frontier.

From about 12 grossly under-strength divisions, the Soviet forces on the frontier had already grown to something on the order of 28 full strength divisions, with the must ample backup of corps and army level units having artillery, rockets and such-like the closure of the trans-Siberian, may perhaps have added another large concentration of Soviet forces, on frontier, perhaps in Outer Mongolia.

There has been no comparable Chinese build-up along

the frontier. But this is meaningless, in view of Mao Tse-tung's strategy for people's war, which calls for drawing the enemy into "the great rear areas," there to be destroyed by the armed and angry people. And there are other recent signs, on the Soviet side, of a most curious character.

It is known, for instance, that all the fraternal parties were solemnly promised that the Soviets would not denounce the Chinese at the recent Moscow party meeting. Yet the main feature of that meeting was really Leonid Brezhnev's long, infuriated tirade against Mao and all his minions.

CURIOUSLY ENOUGH, the Chinese seem to have led the Soviets in actual border provocations. But this, again, is in accord with the Maoist dictum, "We must not show the slightest timidity before a wild beast!" The chances are, however, that the Chinese attempts to prove their iron determination have instead strengthened the hands of the advocates of war in the Kremlin and on the Soviet General Staff.

There must be some advocates of war on the Soviet side, if only because the usefulness of pre-emption—of preventive war, in fact—has always been stressed by an important faction of Soviet military theorists. The real difficulty in fact lies in the extreme requirements of rational pre-emption in the present case.

With their heavily superior forces, the Soviets can of course give the Chinese a sharp lesson along the borders; but this hardly seems worth the inevitable international bother. Unless they have taken leave of their senses, per contra, the Soviets can hardly be thinking of occupying the huge mass of China as they occupied Czechoslovakia.

DESTROYING the Chinese nuclear capability is in truth the only rational aim of a pre-emptive attack. But this is easier said than done. The targets, ranging from the plants producing fissionable material to the plants working on rockets, are far more numerous than most people suppose.

Furthermore, the most important parts of all these plants are dug deep underground, beyond the effective reach of conventional bombs. And destroying them with ground forces would require dangerously deep penetrations into China.

It would be easy, of course, for the Soviets to knock out the Chinese nuclear capability with nuclear weapons, meanwhile using their frontier divisions as a screening force. But unless the masters of the Kremlin are willing to go so far, the thing hardly makes sense.

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Rep. William Bates Dies at 52, On Armed Services Panel



REP. WILLIAM BATES

Rep. William Henry Bates (R-Mass.), a Congressman for 19 years and the ranking Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee, died of stomach cancer yesterday at Bethesda Naval Hospital. He was 52.

Rep. Bates' office said he had undergone X-ray treatment at the hospital from March 19 until early this month.

Bates was known on Capitol Hill as a Vietnam hawk, a defender of the Central Intelligence Agency and an advocate of a modernized, nuclear navy.

In addition to his service on the armed services body, he was the second ranking Republican House member on the House-Senate Atomic Energy Committee.

Born in Salem, Mass., Rep. Bates played varsity football at Brown University before entering the Navy and serving in World War II.

On Nov. 1, 1949, he was a 32-year-old lieutenant commander, stationed in Philadelphia.

On the same day, his father, Rep. George J. Bates (R-Mass.), a member of the House District Committee, was killed here along with 54 other persons, when their airliner, coming in to land at National Airport, collided with a military plane piloted by a young Bolivian.

On Feb. 14, 1950, the younger Bates won a special election to succeed his father, as Congressman from the sixth district of Massachusetts.

Rep. Bates, one of the House members serving as members of the CIA watchdog team, joined House Armed Services chairman Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.) in defending the agency when it came under challenge in 1967.

Responding to criticism of the CIA's infiltration and sponsorship of student groups, Reps. Bates and Rivers issued a statement saying:

"Espionage was not at issue—the survival of freedom was."

In addition to his bachelor's degree from Brown, Rep. Bates also earned a master's degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

President Nixon sent a message of condolence yesterday to Rep. Bates' wife, Pearle.

In addition to his wife, he is survived by a daughter, Susan, of Boston, his mother, Nora, of Salem, and three brothers and three sisters, all of Massachusetts.